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I. Introduction
Kenny Neal was convicted and sentenced to death for murdering
his estranged girlfriend. 2  His court-appointed lawyer had never handled a
capital case prior to Mr. Neal's. In fact, the lawyer had just regained his
license to practice law, which had been revoked for five years after counsel
was convicted of possession of child pornography and sent to federal
prison.3 Immediately after counsel's release from prison, his right to
practice law was reinstated, and the state assigned him to represent Kenny
Neal in his upcoming capital trial. After Mr. Neal's conviction, two jurors
swore in affidavits that they had known of the lawyer's child pornography
conviction and that it was a factor when they considered, and then rejected,
the lawyer's arguments to spare Mr. Neal's life. However, not only was
Neal harmed by his lawyer's reputation, counsel's inadequacy in
performing the basic legal duties necessary for a proper, effective defense
was even more damaging. Despite evidence that Mr. Neal had an IQ well
below average, his attorney failed to document his client's developmental
disability. Counsel also failed to discover and use documents detailing
Neal's cognitive impairment and drug addiction or to adequately prepare
and question expert witnesses for the defense.
We wish we could say that Neal's case is unique. It is not. As one
scholar has aptly said, many death row inmates face execution not because
they committed the worst crimes, but because they had the worst lawyers.
2 State v. Neal, 487 S.E.2d 734 (N.C. 1997).
3 DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, Representation News and Developments: 2003-2001,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=2132 (last visited March 12, 2008).
4 Id.
5 Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime But for
the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994) (recording numerous instances of poor representation in
capital cases) [hereinafter Bright, Worst Lawyer]. See, e.g., James S. Leibman & Lawrence C. Marshall,
Less is Better: Justice Stevens and the Narrowed Death Penalty, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1607, 1664
(2006) ("It is widely recognized that a major flaw in the administration of the death penalty in most
states is the quality of counsel and investigative resources provided to indigent defendants."); Meredith
J. Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys: A System in Need of Reform, 2002
BYU L. REV. 1, 5. Duncan referenced a successful ineffective assistance of counsel case with respect to
a lawyer who slept through substantial portions of trial, and concluded:
What is not unique about his case is the deplorable legal representation that he
received. There are a multitude of cases that reveal legal representation of
criminal defendants as something that can be described as nothing less than 'poor
lawyering.' Unfortunately, this phenomenon occurs more often than our legal
[Vol. 34:2
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Unfortunately, in spite of the well-known phenomena of shoddy and
shameful representation in capital cases, most appeals asserting claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel are unsuccessful. 6 But why? There are a
host of reasons, but the key driving force is the legal standard for assessing
such claims embraced by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington.7
The Supreme Court's recent decisions in Williams v. Taylor,
8
Wiggins v. Smith, 9 and Rompilla v. Beard, 10 however, have provided some
reason for optimism. While purporting to operate within the Strickland
framework, the Court in all these cases held that counsel's representation
was constitutionally inadequate. Optimists would say that these recent
decisions suggest the Court has seen the limitations of the impenetrable
Strickland standard, and is (finally) attempting to effectuate real
improvement in the representation of indigent defendants, especially in
capital cases. This optimism would be grounded in the fact that these cases
appear to embrace a standard thought to be a mere historical relic in Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence: Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla stand for the
proposition that the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice should be used as
norms for determining what is objectively reasonable representation.
Use of the ABA standards as a checklist for objectively reasonable
representation was suggested by Judge Bazelon in the 1970s as the
appropriate standard for determining constitutionally effective counsel."
At the time, this approach was heralded as the best method for assessing the
system may care to admit.
Id. (citing Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 357-401 (5th Cir. 2001)).
6 See, e.g., Frye v. Lee, 235 F.3d 897, 907 (4th Cir. 2000) (admitting the court was troubled by
defense counsel's decades-long routine of drinking approximately twelve ounces of rum each evening
but denying effective assistance claim where there was no showing of specific instances of defective
performance); Gardner v. Dixon, No. 92-4013, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 28147, at *17-36 (4th Cir. Oct.
21, 1992) (per curium) (unpublished opinion) (refusing to vacate petitioner's death sentence where
petitioner had several affidavits demonstrating counsel was severely addicted to cocaine and alcohol and
used both substances throughout trial, because evidence was not newly discovered and defendant made
no showing that trial would have resulted in a different outcome absent the drug and alcohol use); Berry
v. King, 765 F.2d 451, 454 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding no ineffective assistance counsel and that, regardless
of whether or not counsel used drugs during trial, "under Strickland, the fact that an attorney used drugs
is not, in and of itself, relevant to an ineffective assistance claim.").
7 466 U.S. 668 (1984); see Stephen B. Bright, The Politics of Crime and the Death Penalty: Not
"Soft on Crime, "But Hard on the Bill of Rights, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 479, 498 (1995):
The Supreme Court shares a major responsibility for the shameful quality of
counsel that is tolerated in the nation's courts. Chief Justice Warren Burger was
going around the country talking about how trial lawyers were incompetent at the
very same time that the Court he presided over was adopting a standard that
amounts to nothing more than "close enough for government work" in Strickland
vs. Washington.
Id. See also Duncan, supra note 5, at 13-15 (discussing the inordinate difficultly in winning
ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
8 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
9 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
10 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
11 United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 275-300 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Decoster III) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting) (arguing counsel should be judged against ABA guidelines for standard norms as a method
for determining effectiveness).
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quality of attorney representation. 12 When the Court adopted the Strickland
standard, however, it rejected the guidelines approach in favor of the
enunciated two-prong standard. Thus, the change possibly effectuated
through Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla-a requirement that courts look
to the ABA standards when assessing the reasonableness of
representation-suggests that the Court eventually realized that the
Strickland standard, at least in the manner applied by most state and federal
courts, needed a legal facelift.
This article will explore the impact of the Williams, Wiggins, and
Rompilla decisions. We posit that when viewed through the lens of history,
the Court's use of the ABA guidelines is reminiscent of the standard Judge
Bazelon first articulated thirty years ago. Part II of this article contains a
brief history of ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence. Part III
explores the original guidelines approach, and the Supreme Court's ultimate
rejection of that approach in Strickland. In Part IV, we examine Williams,
Wiggins, Rompilla, and the jurisprudential change these opinions establish
as a result of their heavy reliance upon the ABA standards. Part V reviews
the historical emphasis on the pre-trial investigation and mitigation stages
in capital cases. Part VI compares the "new" guideline approach and the
one used by Judge Bazelon. Finally, in Part VII the article explores the
effect of the Court's decisions on ineffective assistance of counsel claims
reviewed by the state and federal courts.
II. A Brief History of the Right to Effective Counsel
The Supreme Court first held indigent defendants had a right to
effective counsel, at least in capital cases, in Powell v. Alabama.'3 Because
the Sixth Amendment had not yet been incorporated, Powell relied upon the
Due Process Clause as the constitutional basis of the right to the effective
assistance of counsel. 14 Over time, the Court moved to the more logical
12 See, e.g., Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based
Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413, 419 (1988); Note,
Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal Defense Counsel: A New Look After
United States v. Decoster, 93 HARV. L. REv. 752, 776-80 (1980); Richard Brody & Rory Albert, Ineffec-
tive Representation as a Basis for Relieffrom Conviction: Principles for Appellate Review, 13 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1,48-53 (1977).
13 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) ("[T]he necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure
of the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due process
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."). Although Powell was the first case to discuss a
client's right to counsel, the actual language of the decision suggested that the right only applied to the
special circumstances of that case. See id. Six years later, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment
guaranteed indigent federal defendants, charged with felony convictions, the right to appointed counsel
in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) ("The Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts,
in all criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he
has or waives the assistance of counsel." (footnotes omitted)). Finally, in Gideon v. Wainwright, the
Court held that the constitutional right to counsel also applied in state courts through the Fourteenth
Amendment. 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963), overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
14 287 U.S. at71.
[Vol. 34:2
HeinOnline -- 34 Am. J. Crim. L. 130 2006-2007
2007] A Return to the Guidelines Approach
Sixth Amendment theory.' 5 The Court, however, did not define the level of
competence required by the Constitution until many years later.
A. The First Tests
Although the right to "effective" counsel has existed since the
Court's original decisions guaranteeing indigent defendants the right to
counsel, the Supreme Court's decisions were case-specific and
unilluminating. 16  In the interim, lower courts struggled to develop an
appropriate standard by which to gauge the quality of counsel's
representation. 
17
Initially, the prevailing standard lower courts used to determine
whether counsel's conduct satisfied the Sixth Amendment was the "farce
and mockery" test.18 This minimal standard asked only whether counsel's
alleged ineffectiveness was so prevalent that it made the proceedings a
"farce and mockery of justice," thereby depriving the defendant of the
constitutional right to a fair trial under the Due Process Clause. Needless to
say, this test frequently left shockingly poor representation beyond the
reach of courts to remedy. 19
Then, in the 1970s, the Supreme Court indicated in Tollett v.
Henderson20 and McMann v. Richardson21 that the Sixth Amendment may
require more effort on the part of counsel. These cases implied that a
defendant would prevail in proving he had ineffective assistance if
counsel's conduct was not "within the range of competence demanded of
15 See, e.g., Wade v. United States, 388 U.S. 218, 223-38 (1967) (noting that the right to effective
counsel is an integral part of the right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment as well as the
Fifth Amendment).
16 See supra note 13.
17 See, e.g., Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1945). In Diggs, the court specifically
stated that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee effective counsel and that a defendant's only source
for relief would be through the Fifth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. ("In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.");
Diggs, 148 F.2d at 669-70. The court recognized a strong deference to counsel, regardless of their
mistakes, and concluded no test could adequately measure when an attorney's tactical mistakes had
crossed the threshold into ineffectiveness. See id. at 670. Lower courts' reluctance to find counsel
ineffective stemmed from many fears, including the fear that doing so would encourage constant
challenges by convicted criminals, burden defense lawyers to such a degree as to discourage them from
accepting court assignments and thereby bring the court system to a halt, encourage lawyers to
deliberately make mistakes to assist defendants, and place appellate courts in the undesirable position of
second guessing defense tactics with the benefit of hindsight. See United States v. Hager, 505 F.2d 737,
739-40 (8th Cir. 1974); David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. I,
22-26 (1973) [hereinafter Bazelon, Defective Assistance]; Vivian 0. Berger, The Supreme Court and
Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths - A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 65-66 (1986).
18 See United States v. Long, 419 F.2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1969) ("[T]he rule is well established that
counsel's actions or omissions must be of such a nature as to render the trial a farce and a mockery of
justice which shocks the conscience of the court.").
19 See, e.g., Rice v. United States, 420 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1969); Grant v. Oklahoma, 382 F.2d 270
(10th Cir. 1967); Daugherty v. Beto, 388 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1967).
20 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973).
21 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970).
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attorneys in criminal cases. ' , 22 After McMann, many courts adopted some
version of this reasonable competence test. 23 Observers largely criticized
this vague test, however, on the basis that it was not significantly different
from the "farce and mockery" standard.24
Corresponding with the judicial debate about the appropriate level
of competence for counsel, the ABA created the Special Committee on
Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice which included Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger as Honorary Chairman. .25 The ABA Committee
also included an Advisory Committee on the Prosecution and Defense
Functions which was chaired by the Chief Justice.26 These committees
created a tentative draft in March of 1970 which included standards for
defense counsel.27 Although these standards were arguably general and
non-specific, when viewed in conjunction with the commentary, the
standards acted as guides for defense attorneys, establishing some minimum
requirements of competency. The new standards placed a heavy focus on
certain specific duties, such as the duty to investigate, which, as we shall
see, would become the most heavily scrutinized aspect of defense counsel's
representation.28
The new ABA Guidelines fueled scholarly and judicial debate
regarding the appropriate standard courts should use to resolve ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. One camp believed the law should not simply
be concerned with a particularly poorly represented defendant. Rather, a
rigorous legal standard was needed in order to increase the quality of
criminal defense representation across the board, particularly in cases
involving court appointed counsel for indigent clients.29 Statistics of
22 Id. at 771.
23 See, e.g., United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1120-21 (1st Cir. 1978) (using the range of
competence test); Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir. 1977) (same); Akridge v. Hopper,
545 F.2d 457, 459 (5th Cir. 1977) (same); United States v. Toney, 527 F.2d 716, 720 (6th Cir. 1975)
(same); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1978) (same).
24 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 17, at 16 (suggesting that the farce and mockery definition was
autological and hardly useful).
25 STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION
(Tentative Draft March 1970).
26 Id.
27 Id. The introduction to the Defense Function begins: "subjects in the administration of criminal
justice are more in need of clarification than the role of the defense lawyer in a criminal case." Id. at
141. See infra Part VI.A. 1, pp. 28-29 (discussing the ABA Standards).
28 Id. at 224-28.
29 See, e.g., J. Eric Smithbum & Theresa L. Springmann, Effective Assistance of Counsel: In
Quest of a Uniform Standard of Review, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497, 497-98 (1981) (arguing a
Supreme Court standard for effective counsel will prevent claims from arising as well as ease appellate
review); cf William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical
Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 95 (1995) (commenting on how,
contrary to promoting superior defense counsel performance, Strickland has instead "[flostered the
continuation of criminal defense performance that is often characterized not only by general laziness,
deceit, and incompetence, but also by abandonment of clients to their accusers"); see also Douglas W.
Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43
BUFF. L. REV. 329, 333 (1995) (arguing "the primary obstacle to the full implementation of [the
procedural and substantive rules afforded to capital defendants] is the chronic and severe underfunding
[Vol. 34:2
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unmanageable caseloads combined with inadequate funds had surfaced, and
many practitioners and scholars, including defense attorneys themselves,
had visions of the mandatory funding and maximum caseload limits that
would surely follow a constitutional standard on effectiveness that had
some teeth.3° Others, however, believed courts should only be concerned
with the reliability of the verdict in the case under review.3'
Entering the fray, Chief Judge David Bazelon of the District of
Columbia Circuit announced a standard for evaluating counsel's
performance that offered real guidance to lawyers and judges. Judge
Bazelon advocated a categorical or guideline approach that enumerated
specific duties counsel must perform.32 He found these duties in the newly
approved ABA standards of criminal practice.33 The legal world, seeking a
more effective method of review, welcomed the addition of this
"categorical" or "check-list" approach.34
The Supreme Court, however, appeared to relegate Judge Bazelon's
approach to the historical archives when it announced its now familiar two-
prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims in Strickland v.
of indigent defense services by state and local governments throughout the United States.").
30 See David L. Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEO L.J. 811, 815-16
(1976) [hereinafter Bazelon, Realities] (documenting problems inherent in the public defense system);
Berger, supra note 17, at 60-61 (identifying the problems associated with indigent defense counsel);
Steven B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal Services to the Poor When
Life and Liberty are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 789; Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante Parity Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242,
245 (1997) (documenting the eminent crisis of institutional indigent defense); Richard Klein, The
Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1433, 1446, 1425-45 (1999)
[hereinafter Klein, Constitutionalization] (describing the crisis of indigent defense after the time of
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), including crowded dockets and severely under-funded
resources); Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the
Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 651, 656-63
(1986) [hereinafter Klein, Emperor Gideon] (discussing problems with the national defense counsel
system).
31 See Stephen G. Giles, Comment, Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Sixth Amendment and
the Fair Trial Guarantee, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1380 (1983) (contending the Supreme Court did not inter-
pret the Sixth Amendment as mandating competent defense counsel); see also Kimmelman v. Morrison,
477 U.S. 365, 396 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (suggesting defense counsel's failure
to raise a meritorious Fourth Amendment claim at trial cannot form the basis for a successful ineffective
assistance of counsel claim under the Sixth Amendment because the only effect of the error is 'the ad-
mission of illegally seized but reliable evidence' and, therefore, error does not affect the accuracy or the
fairness of the verdict).
32 See United States v. Decoster (Decoster 1), 487 F.2d 1197, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd on
rehearing en banc, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also United States v. Decoster (Decoster III), 624
F.2d 196, 276 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
33 See Decoster 111, 624 F.2d at 276 (Bazelon, J., dissenting); Decoster 1, 487 F.2d at 1203; ABA
PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO: THE PROSECUTION
FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (App. Draft 1971); see also Bazelon, Defective Assistance,
supra note 17, at 20-40 (interpreting the checklist approach and effective assistance of counsel in greater
depth); infra Part lI.A., pp. 9-14.
34 See Calhoun, supra note 12, at 419 (1988) (noting that the debate as to whether this
"categorical" method is the most appropriate procedure for review has occupied courts and
commentators throughout the country).
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Washington.35  The Court, in fact, specifically rejected the checklist
approach in favor of a more deferential standard. In the Supreme Court's
opinion, "[t]hese basic duties neither exhaustively define the obligations of
counsel nor form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney
performance. 36
Thus, although the Court finally articulated a much needed standard
for reviewing courts to use when resolving ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, as we discuss below, it adopted what most scholars considered to be
an essentially meaningless test, which, for all practical purposes, was only a
slight improvement to the "farce and mockery" test, if an improvement at
all.37
B. The Strickland Constitutional Standard
In Strickland v. Washington,38 the Court established a two-prong
test that a defendant must satisfy to prove that he was denied his Sixth
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. First, the defendant
must show that counsel's performance was deficient because it "fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness." 39  Second, the defendant must
show that, but for counsel's errors, a reasonable probability exists that the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different.40  The standard the
Court adopted proved virtually impossible for defendants to meet, and
instead of raising the bar for effective counsel, the Court created a bar to
nearly all assertions of attorney inadequacy. 4'
Following Strickland, the Supreme Court itself failed to find a
single instance of constitutionally inadequate representation for sixteen
years. Three years after Strickland, in fact, Justice Marshall lamented that
35 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
36 Id. at 688.
37 See, e.g., RANDALL COYNE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 148 (1995)
(referring to the post-Strickland analysis as the Foggy Mirror test: one puts a mirror in front of the
lawyer's mouth during trial and, so long as the mirror fogs and counsel is alive, the lawyer is deemed
effective); Geimer, supra note 29, at 91 (arguing that the Strickland court has effectively ensured that
Gideon guarantees little more than the presence of a person with a law license alongside the accused
during trial); Klein, Constitutionalization, supra note 30, at 1446 ("[T]he Strickland Court interpreted
the requirements of the Sixth Amendment's right to effective assistance of counsel in such an ultimately
meaningless manner as to require little more than a warm body with a law degree standing next to the
defendant." (footnotes omitted)); Richard L. Gabriel, Comment, The Strickland Standard for Claims of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of Due Process, 134
U. PA. L. REv. 1259 (1986) (arguing that the Strickland two-prong test undermines the Sixth
Amendment goal of effectuating ajust trial result through proper adversarial proceedings).
38 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
39 Id. at 688.
40 Id.; see infra note 83 (discussing the pertinent facts of the case).
41 See Bright, Worst Lawyer, supra note 5, at 1844 ("The minimal standard of legal representation
in the defense of poor people, as . . . interpreted by the Supreme Court [in Strickland], offers little
protection to the poor person stuck with a bad lawyer."); Calhoun, supra note 12, at 427 (writing that the
Strickland standard "creates an almost insurmountable hurdle for defendants claiming ineffective
assistance"); Geimer, supra note 3 1, at 93.
[Vol. 34:2
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since the Strickland test was established, the Court had never identified an
instance of attorney dereliction that met its stringent standard.42
Accordingly, what was supposed to be an objective test became a game of
luck for convicted criminals attempting to prove ineffective counsel-a
game that largely depended upon the state court or federal court of appeals
that reviewed the case.43
In 2000, however, things began to change. Beginning with the
Williams decision, then continuing with Wiggins in 2003 and Rompilla in
2005, the Court began to actually police defense counsel's performances; in
all three cases the Court held that counsel's performance in a capital case
was objectively unreasonable." Although ostensibly adhering to
Strickland, the combined effect of the three cases evidences a clear
doctrinal shift. 45 Most significantly, all three cases place great emphasis on
existing national standards of adequate representation, such as the ABA
guidelines. Thus, one could argue, and we do, that the Court has finally
adopted at least the framework of the checklist approach Judge Bazelon
advocated thirty years ago. The unresolved questions are whether the Court
itself will stay the course and, if so, whether the state and lower federal
courts will follow the Supreme Court's lead.
III. A Look Back, and Forward, to the Guidelines Approach
A. The Original Guidelines Approach
The guidelines approach is premised on the belief that certain
fundamental, and specific, tasks and duties must be performed in all
criminal cases. Thus, the method utilizes a common set of standards that
comprise these necessary functions and considers whether counsel
substantially failed in any of the designated areas.
Before Strickland, when the range of legal standards discussed
previously were in flux, Judge Bazelon strongly advocated for this
categorical standard, which proved popular with legal scholars. Although
ultimately his standard did not become articulated law, many lamented, and
continue to bemoan, the short life of Judge Bazelon's categorical
42 Mitchell v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 1026, 1026 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987) (finding no ineffective assistance of
counsel); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 186 (1986) (finding no ineffective assistance of
counsel).
43 See, e.g., John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Fourth Circuit's "Double-Edged Sword":
Eviscerating the Right to Present Mitigating Evidence and Beheading the Right to the Assistance of
Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1480, 1480-82, 1498 (1999) (noting that the Fourth Circuit "has always been
particularly inhospitable to ineffective assistance of counsel claims in capital cases").
44 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524-26 (2003);
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383-87 (2005).
45 Leibman & Marshall, supra note 5, at 1666 (noting how Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla
"reveal a willingness on the Court's part to scrutinize death sentences more vigorously, particularly in
cases falling near the mitigated circumference").
2007]
HeinOnline -- 34 Am. J. Crim. L. 135 2006-2007
AM. J. CRIM. L.
approach.46
Judge Bazelon's attempt to articulate a more rigorous standard for
assessing the effectiveness of defense counsel's conduct began with Willie
Decoster's case. Decoster was convicted of aiding and abetting, and in
some respects ending, an armed robbery and assault with a dangerous
weapon.47  Decoster's court-appointed attorney's performance during the
trial raised several viable issues of ineffectiveness. Counsel made a number
of mistakes during the trial, including failing to file a timely bond review
motion, failing to obtain a transcript of the preliminary hearing, prematurely
indicating that he was ready for trial, failing to make an opening statement,
and, most significantly, failing to interview a single witness prior to trial.48
Following his conviction, Decoster appealed to the District of Columbia
Circuit. The Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Bazelon, raised the
issue of the adequacy of counsel's representation sua sponte, and remanded
the case for a hearing on the issue of defense counsel's competency.49 In
that opinion, Judge Bazelon articulated his new standard for effective
assistance of counsel claims and adopted the checklist approach to evaluate
the representation. 50  He argued that defendants are entitled to "the
reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent
conscientious advocate." 51  Importantly, Bazelon held that the rhetoric
"reasonably competent assistance" was merely shorthand terminology and
"not subject to ready application., 52  "Effective," according to Judge
Bazelon, needed a more tangible definition; thus, he articulated some
particular duties courts should require of counsel.53 Only if counsel was
found to have performed these enumerated tasks would their assistance be
considered legally effective.54  Generally, Bazelon's approach required
appellate courts to compare counsel's actions, while still looking at the
totality of circumstances of the case, 55 to the responsibilities listed in the
46 United States v. Decoster (Decoster 111), 624 F.2d 196, 264-299 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting). See, e.g., Calhoun, supra note 12 (promoting a hybrid checklistlStrickland approach as the
most viable because of Strickland's insurmountable standard); Joseph D. Grano, The Right to Counsel:
Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN. L. REV. 1175, 1248-49 (1970) (advocating defense
lawyers submit a confidential worksheet to the trial judge indicating specifically which tasks they have
completed); Smithbum & Springmann, supra note 29, at 524-526 (urging the Supreme Court to adopt a
categorical approach).
47 United States v. Decoster (Decoster 1), 487 F.2d. 1197, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
48 Decoster 111, 624 F.2d at 211.
49 Decoster 1, 487 F.2d at 1197-98.
50 Id. at 1203.
51 Id. at 1202; see also supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text discussing the "range of
competence" standard history.
52 Decoster 1, 487 F.2d at 1203.
53 id.; see also ABA Standards, Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, The Prosecution
Function and the Defense Function (App. Draft 1971).
54 Decoster 1, 487 F.2d at 1203.
55 Although Judge Bazelon used the words "checklist" and "enumerated standards," he never
considered the standard to be a type of master list against which reviewing judges would actually
compare and remand cases for boxes left blank. He wrote:
Naturally, given the complexities of each case and the constant call for
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newly promulgated American Bar Association Project on Standards for
Criminal Justice.
56
Specifically, Judge Bazelon believed that: (1) "Counsel should
confer with his client without delay and as often as necessary to elicit
matters of defense, or to ascertain that potential defenses are unavailable;"
(2) "Counsel should discuss fully all potential strategies and tactical choices
with his client;" (3) "Counsel should promptly advise his client of his rights
and take all actions necessary to preserve them;" and (4) "Counsel must
conduct [an] appropriate investigation[], both factual and legal, to
determine" what defenses are available.57 Furthermore, Judge Bazelon
concluded that where a defendant demonstrates counsel failed to fulfill any
of these requirements, the burden of proof would shift to the government to
establish a lack of prejudice. 58  It was the Supreme Court's subsequent
decision to instead place the burden of establishing prejudice on the
defendant that many critics considered to be the straw that broke the
proverbial camel's back.
Judge Bazelon was not the first person to suggest a checklist
approach. He actually expanded on the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Coles v.
Peyton,59 which articulated some of the specific duties attorneys owe their
professional discretion, it would be a misguided endeavor to engrave in stone any
rules for attorney performance. Nonetheless, preserving flexibility is not
incompatible with establishing minimum components of effective assistance, and
the ABA Standards give helpful guidance in pursuing both aims.
United States v. Decoster (Decoster 111), 624 F.2d 196, 276-77 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting) (footnotes omitted). But see Berger, supra note 17, at 84 (arguing that if the totality of the
circumstances are taken into account, the specific standards will melt into the reasonableness test and
become only guides as they are in Strickland).
56 See ABA STANDARDS, PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION
FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (App. Draft 1971).
57 Decoster 111, 624 F.2d at 276 n.63 (Bazelon, J., dissenting); Decoster 1, 487 F.2d at 1203-04
(internal citations omitted).
58 Decoster 111, 624 F.2d at 290-96 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). Judge Bazelon noted that two factors
justified placing the burden on the government. First, requiring the defendant to show prejudice would
shift the burden to the defendant to establish the likelihood of his own innocence. This, Judge Bazelon
concluded, is the antithesis of the American adversarial system which holds a defendant innocent until
proven guilty. Second, "proof of prejudice may . . . be absent from the record precisely because
[defense] counsel [was] ineffective." Id. at 291; Decoster 1, 487 F.2d at 1204. See Calhoun, supra note
12, at 428-29 (arguing that by placing the burden to show harm on the defendant, the Strickland Court
mistakenly implied that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel exists only to help
the factually innocent); Alan W. Clarke, Procedural Labyrinths and the Injustice of Death: A Critique of
Death Penalty Habeas Corpus (Part One), 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1327, 1353 (1995) (positing that since
the Court seems to equate the fairness of the trial with innocence, the defendant must prove innocence in
at least some sense (including the odd concept of innocence of the death penalty) before relief will be
forthcoming); Geimer, supra note 29, at 133-36 (arguing that burden of proof should be on government
to show harmless error once defendant has established deficient performance); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier,
Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel and the
Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425 (1996) (advocating that the prejudice prong
often leads to unjust results and, in certain circumstances, prejudice must be presumed).
59 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968). Coles is an especially interesting early effective assistance of
counsel jurisprudence phenomenon because, after Strickland, the Fourth Circuit became the most
notorious circuit for rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel claims in capital cases. See Blume &
Johnson, supra note 43 (discussing the Fourth Circuit's inhospitality to ineffective assistance of counsel
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clients:
Counsel for an indigent defendant should be appointed promptly.
Counsel should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to prepare
to defend an accused. Counsel must confer with his client without
undue delay and as often as necessary, to advise him of his rights
and to elicit matters of defense or to ascertain that potential
defenses are unavailable. Counsel must conduct appropriate
investigations, both factual and legal, to determine if matters of
defense can be developed, and to allow himself enough time for
reflection and preparation for trial.60
Like Judge Bazelon, the Coles court concluded that an attorney's
"omission or failure to abide by these [duties] constitutes a denial of
effective [assistance] of counsel," and the burden shifts to the government
to establish a lack of prejudice.6'
The checklist approach, as Judge Bazelon described it, attempted to
define effective assistance of counsel in terms of services to defendants.62
In Bazelon's opinion, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and
concomitantly, the right to effective counsel, is not dependent upon the
strength of the evidence of the defendant's guilt.63  Specified minimum
requirements of competent attorney performance, Bazelon believed, would
give substance to the Sixth Amendment mandate. 64  Even the most
obviously guilty of defendants, who could conceivably never prove
counsel's poor representation was likely to alter a trial outcome, is still
guaranteed the constitutional right to an attorney who is "an active advocate
in behalf of his client. ' 65  As Judge Bazelon explained, "[w]here such
advocacy is absent, the accused has been denied effective assistance,
claims).
60 Coles, 389 F.2d at 226.
61 Id.
62 See Decoster II1, 624 F.2d 196, 266 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J., dissenting). Judge Bazelon
wrote:
In constructing standards for assessing the ineffective assistance of counsel, we
must therefore consider not only what measures are necessary to assure a fair trial
in the case of any particular defendant. We also must structure our approach to
eliminate the gross disparities of representation that make a mockery of our
commitment to equal justice.
Id.
63 Id. at 287-290.
64 See id. at 276 ("[These] duties ... represent the rudiments of competent lawyering guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment to every defendant in a criminal proceeding.").
65 Id. at 288 (quoting Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967)); see also Klein, Emperor
Gideon, supra note 30, at 644-45 (arguing against the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, and noting
the right to adequate representation ought not hinge on the guilt or innocence of the accused); Note,
Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal Defense Counsel: A New Look After
United States v. Decoster, 93 HARV. L. REV. 752, 772 (1980) (advocating Judge Bazelon's approach to
the prejudice prong).
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regardless of his guilt or innocence. 66
A robust investigation was an essential demand of effective
representation.67 This was so for several reasons. First, in order for the
adversary system to function properly, both sides must prepare and organize
their cases in advance of trial.68 Second, proper investigation is critical to
uncovering favorable facts and allows trial counsel to take full advantage of
procedural safeguards for achieving a reliable verdict such as cross-
examination and impeachment.69  Third, investigation ensures that
attorneys proffer all possible legal defenses and demand that the
government prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.7°
Finally, investigation is essential for procedural matters outside of trial,
such as arguing for lesser bail, urging for the reduction or dismissal of
charges, and advocating for appropriate pleas and favorable sentences.71
Consequently, the attorney who is ineffective in the investigative phase
might never be able to rectify her performance and provide her client with
an adequate defense.
As previously mentioned, Judge Bazelon's checklist approach
emerged when the Decoster case came back to the D.C. Circuit for the
ultimate decision.72 On remand after Decoster I, the district court denied
the motion for a new trial.73 On appeal from that decision, the panel
reversed the lower court and held Willie Decoster had been denied effective
assistance of counsel.74  The en banc court, however, granted the
government's motion for rehearing, vacated the Decoster II panel opinion,
and ordered supplemental briefing and oral argument. Judge Leventhal,
writing for the en banc majority, ultimately concluded that Willie
Decoster's attorney had not been constitutionally ineffective.75 By the time
Decoster III was issued, the Bazelon-Leventhal battle was infamous.
Unfortunately, the categorical standard approach did not prove to be the
prevailing standard. In dissent in Decoster III, Judge Bazelon, joined by
Judge Skelly Wright, continued to argue adamantly for the checklist
result. 76 Judge Leventhal's majority opinion rejected Judge Bazelon's
66 Decoster 111, 624 F.2d at 288 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 277-80. According to Judge Bazelon, "[p]rominent among the duties of defense counsel
is the obligation to 'conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to determine what matter
of defense can be developed."' Id. at 277 (quoting United States v. Decoster (Decoster 1), 487 F.2d
1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973)); see infra Part V, pp. 21-25 (evaluating the historical importance of
investigation to effective counsel claims).
68 Decoster III, 624 F.2d 196, 277-78 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 278. Judge Bazelon emphasizes this point by noting that, in the practical sense, cases are
won on the facts. Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 See id. at 276-301.
73 See id. at 200 (majority opinion).
74 For Decoster 11 panel opinion, see Decoseter 111, 624 F.2d 196, 300 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (reprinting
panel opinion in appendix).
75 Decoster II1, 624 F.2d 196.
76 See id.; see also Bazelon, Defective Assistance, supra note 17, passim (arguing for the checklist
20071
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theory, preferring instead a case-by-case approach to ineffective assistance
of counsel claims similar to the method subsequently embraced by the
Supreme Court in Strickland.
Leventhal's standard first considered whether counsel's
performance demonstrated serious incompetency falling measurably below
the performance ordinarily expected of fallible lawyers.77 Interestingly,
Judge Leventhal's test also required defendants to prove that counsel's
inadequacy was likely to have affected the outcome of the trial.78 When
Judge Leventhal applied this new standard to the facts of Decoster's case,
Decoster's conviction was upheld.
B. The Strickland Judgmental Approach and its Impenetrable Standard of
Review
In 1984, the Supreme Court finally established the constitutional
standard for determining whether a defendant was denied his Sixth
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel in Strickland v.
Washington.79 The Court rejected a checklist approach and instead
established a two-prong test for appealing defendants. The Court indicated
that the two-prong test was designed primarily to ensure that defense
counsel submitted the State's case to proper adversarial testing, thereby
assuring appellate courts that the trial outcome was reliable. 80  Thus, the
Court delimited the purpose of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to be
that of promoting reliable verdicts.81
In Strickland, petitioner based his claim primarily on his trial
counsel's failure to properly investigate mitigating evidence that could and
should have been presented during the sentencing phase of his capital
trial.82 In rejecting this claim, the Court emphasized that great deference
approach to ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
77 See Decoster 111, 624 F.2d at 208 (majority opinion).
78 Id. ("[The] accused must bear the initial burden of demonstrating a likelihood that counsel's
inadequacy affected the outcome of the trial."); id. at 221. See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984) (placing the burden upon the defendant to prove actual harm). But cf Decoster III,
624.F. 2d at 290-96 (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (arguing where defendant proves that counsel deficiencies
were substantially inadequate, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate beyond a reasonable
doubt that counsel performance did not actually affect the result).
79 466 U.S. 668, 668 (1984).
80 Id. at 686 ("[Tjhe benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether
counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot
be relied on as having produced a just result."). But see supra Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4"h
Cir. 1968) (discussing how in order to keep the proper balance of the adversarial system whereby the
defendant is innocent until proven guilty, the burden of proof must be upon the government to prove no
harmful result due to ineffective counsel).
81 See U.S. CONST. amend. Xl; see e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 426 (1977) (Burger, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he fundamental purpose of the Sixth Amendment is to safeguard the fairness of the trial
.); cf supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text (discussing how both guilty and innocent
defendants possess the constitutional right to a fair trial and how the checklist approach safeguards that
right).
82 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 675. Specifically, petitioner asserted counsel was ineffective for his
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should be given to trial counsel's tactical decisions.83 Additionally,
although the Court in Strickland mentioned the ABA guidelines, the Court
expressly stated a checklist would be an impossible way to measure
effectiveness and that the use of guidelines to define effectiveness was
improper.84 Specifically, the Court noted, "[p]revailing norms of practice
as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like . . . are
guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides."85 The
Court insisted that no specific set of rules could properly encapsulate the
variety of circumstances lawyers frequently encounter and to which
attorneys must often quickly respond.86 Any such set of rules, the Court
concluded, "would interfere with the constitutionally protected
independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in
making tactical decisions. 87  Notably, the Court cited the Decoster III
majority opinion for this proposition.
Thus, the Court adopted what has been referred to as the
judgmental approach, similar to Judge Leventhal's method, for effective
assistance claims whereby cases are adjudicated on a case-by-case basis
using a general and vague reasonableness standard to gauge attorney
performance. 88
failure to "request a psychiatric report, to investigate and present character witnesses, to seek a
presentence investigation report, to present meaningful arguments to the sentencing judge, and to
investigate the medical examiner's reports or cross-examine the medical experts." Id. Respondent in
Strickland pled guilty to three brutal capital murders. During his preparation for the sentencing hearing,
the defense counsel did not seek out character witnesses for respondent, other than his wife and mother,
nor did counsel request a psychiatric examination. Moreover, counsel decided he would not present
evidence concerning respondent's character and emotional state, so he did not investigate such evidence.
Defense counsel stated he felt hopeless about the case and based his strategy upon the trial judge's
reputation for leniency for those criminals who, like the respondent, had accepted responsibility for their
crimes. However, because the trial judge found several aggravating circumstances and no substantial
mitigating circumstances, he sentenced petitioner to death. Id. at 671-75.
83 Id. at 689 ("Any such set of rules would interfere with the constitutionally protected
independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions.").
84 Id. at 688-89. The Court wrote:
Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards
and the like ... are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only
guides. . . . Indeed, the existence of detailed guidelines for representation could
distract counsel from the overriding mission of vigorous advocacy of the
defendant's cause.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
85 Id. at 688.
86 See id. at 688-89 ("No particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily
take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate
decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.").
87 Id. at 689 (citing United States v. Decoster (Decoster 11I), 624 F.2d 196, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
88 See Calhoun, supra note 12, at 419; see also John C. Jeffries & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective
Assistance and Procedural Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 682 (1990) ("In
practice, the constitutional standard for ineffective assistance of counsel approximates gross
negligence.").
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IV. The "Triumvirate" (But Partial) Return of the Checklist Approach
The Strickland standard proved virtually impossible to meet.
Almost all representation was found to be within Strickland's "wide range
of professionally competent assistance."89  Claims that navigated safely
through the performance prong channel generally went aground on the rock
of prejudice. Even in capital cases, where life and death literally hung in
the balance, courts often deferred to incomprehensible "strategic" decisions
provided by trial counsel rationalizing their slothful representation. As we
shall see, shortly, the Court itself rejected several substantial claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland.90
A. Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla: A Return to the Guidelines Approach
With the new millennium came change. The first chink in
Strickland's armor appeared when the Court concluded in Williams v.
Taylor that Terry Williams's counsel had been constitutionally
ineffective. 91 Although it was a landmark result, much of the opinion was
dedicated to explaining the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which was part
of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA"). The ultimate decision was in some respects anticlimactic with
respect to the standard for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. 92  Nonetheless, the Court, citing the ABA Standards for Criminal
89 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 690 (1984).
90 Sixteen years passed, and the Court did not once find ineffective assistance of counsel. See-
Coyne, supra note 37. Justice Marshall expressed his fear that such a precedent would "permit the
lower courts to conclude that the Sixth Amendment guarantees no more than that 'a person who happens
to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused ....' Mitchell v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 1026, 1026
(1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685, which
specifically held that such a lawyer is not enough to satisfy the constitutional command). It would take
the Court thirteen years after Mitchell to find an attorney to have been ineffective. The lower courts
seemed to have reached Marshall's feared conclusion about the Sixth Amendment guarantees after all.
91 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
92 One reason why Williams's reach is limited is because later the Court, in Wiggins v. Smith,
went out of its way to demonstrate that it had created "no new law" in Williams. Wiggins v. Smith, 539
U.S. 510, 521-522 (2003). Interestingly, this declaration seems to highlight a clear doctrinal shift
starting with Wiggins: by insinuating that Williams did not create new law, the Court emphasized that
Wiggins, in contrast, did. Moreover, Justice Scalia's dissent in Wiggins, which focused mainly on the
appropriate scope of habeas review, explicitly stated that he believed the majority created new law on
ineffective assistance of counsel in the Williams decision. See id. at 542 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his
dissent, Scalia argued not only that Wiggins was not denied the effective assistance of counsel, but,
moreover, the Court should not have even considered the merits of the issue case due to the limited
review permitted to federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Id. at 538-57. In order to grant habeas
relief, a federal court must determine that the state court decision was "contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law" that was in effect at the time of the relevant
state court's decision. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2001). Justice Scalia complained that the Wiggins
majority cited to Williams when referring to the federal authority to grant habeas review, even though
Williams was decided after the state court rejected Wiggins's initial ineffective assistance claim.
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 541-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that the Court could not use
Williams as authority for how the state court unreasonably applied federal law, because Williams, being
new law, was not in effect at the time of the state court decision. See id. Justice Scalia used the fact that
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Justice, concluded that "trial counsel did not fulfill their obligation to
conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's background," and that
because of this deficiency, there was a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different, and the Court
remanded the case for a new trial.
93
Specifically, the Court found that counsel had not even started
preparing for the sentencing phase of the proceedings until a week before
the trial94 and had "failed to conduct an investigation that would have
uncovered extensive records graphically describing Williams' nightmarish
childhood, not because of any strategic calculation but because they
incorrectly thought that state law barred access to such records. 95
Additionally, counsel presented none of the available evidence showing that
Williams was "'borderline mentally retarded' and did not advance beyond
sixth grade in school. 96 Counsel failed to seek prison records recording
commendations for Williams or to obtain favorable testimony by prison
officials. 97 In documenting counsel's deficiencies, the Court relied upon
the ABA guidelines in concluding that counsel's performance was
objectively unreasonable. Thus, the Court began the process of moving the
jurisprudential mountain. Notably, Justice O'Connor, the author of
Strickland, authored the majority opinion in Williams for the Court.
Three years after Williams, the Court agreed to hear Kevin
Wiggins's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.98  The Court again
embraced the ABA guidelines as a critical tool in evaluating counsel's
performance. In Wiggins, the Court held that petitioner's attorneys were
ineffective for failing to properly investigate their client's background and
social history in preparation for the sentencing phase of his capital trial. 99
Theoretically, the Court applied the Strickland test, but it did so in a more
robust manner which was ultimately different, not only in degree, but in
kind from Strickland. In effect, the Court countenanced a method for
evaluating counsel's representation that greatly resembled the categorical
approach advocated by Judge Bazelon.
An examination of the facts of the case will help set the stage.
Wiggins waived his right to a jury trial and was convicted by a trial judge of
first-degree murder, robbery, and two counts of theft. After his conviction,
the Williams court cited to the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, even though Strickland had
eschewed courts from demanding counsel to perform to such standards, to argue that the Court did make
new law in Williams. Id. at 543. Thus, Justice Scalia recognized and pronounced the Court's shift in
ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence when it relied upon the ABA Standards as guidelines for
determining reasonableness.
93 Williams, 529 U.S. at 396.
94 Id. at 395-96 (citing 1 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1, commentary at 4-55 (2d
ed. 1980)).
95 Williams, 529 U.S. at 395.
96 Id. at 396.
97 Id.
98 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
99 Id.
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Wiggins elected to be sentenced by a jury. Counsel moved to bifurcate the
sentencing phase in order to first present evidence that Wiggins did not kill
the victim by his own hand and then, if necessary, to present evidence in
mitigation. The court denied the motion, and in her opening statement, trial
counsel told the jurors they would hear evidence that another person killed
the victim. Furthermore, counsel told the jury they would learn about
Wiggins's difficult and tumultuous life. But counsel did not introduce
evidence regarding Wiggins's life history. The jury sentenced Wiggins to
death.'00
The Supreme Court held that Wiggins was denied his constitutional
right to the effective assistance of counsel. 10' First, the Court referenced
the conclusion in Williams that the attorneys' failure to uncover and present
abundant mitigation evidence at sentencing could not be a tactical choice
because counsel had not 'fulfilled their obligation to conduct a thorough
investigation of the defendant's background."",10 2  The Wiggins majority
likewise concluded that the attorneys' decision not to present mitigation
evidence was unreasonable because it too was based on an inadequate
investigation into the possible mitigation evidence. Importantly, as in
Williams, the Court relied upon the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice as
establishing the requisite standard of care. 103
Wiggins, however, sent a much stronger message on the importance
of the ABA standards in evaluating attorney competence than did Williams.
The Court repeatedly referred to national standards, such as the ABA
Guidelines, as well as local attorney practice. It concluded that, in light of
trial counsel's failure to perform the tasks outlined in the ABA Standards
and local state professional practice, the attorneys acted unreasonably. 10 4
"Counsel's conduct," according to the Court, "fell short of the standards for
capital defense work articulated by the American Bar Association (ABA)-
standards to which we long have referred as 'guides to determining what is
reasonable."' 10 5 Wiggins's counsel's performance should have conformed
to ABA guidelines that "provide that investigations into mitigating evidence
'should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating
evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be
introduced by the prosecutor."' 0 6 Assessed against these norms, the Court
100 ld. at 514-17.
101 See id. at 517-19 for the procedural posture of the case.
102 Id. at 522 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000)).
103 Id.; see also Williams, 520 U.S. at 396 (citing I ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-
4.1, commentary at 4-55 (2d ed. 1980)). See also supra note 92 (discussing how Justice Scalia used the
very fact that Williams referred to the ABA Standards when determining ineffective assistance of
counsel as evidence that the Court changed the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel).
104 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522-25 (2003). The Court referred to the ABA guidelines as
"well-defined norms." Id. at 524. See infra Part VI.A., p. 26 (discussing how the phrasing of ABA
guidelines as "norms" is contrary to the Strickland articulation).
105 Id. at 524 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
106 Id. (quoting ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES 11.4.1(c), p. 9 3 (1989)).
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found counsel's representation objectively unreasonable. Because
counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial to the outcome of
Wiggins's trial, the Court reversed the judgment of the Fourth Circuit and
ordered a new sentencing hearing.' 
07
The Wiggins Court posited that it was applying the "clearly
established" Strickland standard. Although true to some degree, the Court's
use of the ABA Standards to place much needed legal flesh on the
Strickland skeleton in fact marked a significant doctrinal shift.'0 8 Justice
Scalia, in a vigorous dissent, outlined the manner in which the majority
created new law by using the ABA Standards to define competent attorney
performance. 10 9  Even though the dissent is Scalia-like and typically
hyperbolic, it is not completely off the mark.
In its prior ineffective assistance of counsel cases, the Court had
specifically rejected the idea of minimum standards for a reasonable
investigation, holding that the minimal investigation conducted by trial
counsel in those cases to be sufficient. 0  The Wiggins Court, by contrast,
recast the prior decisions as involving situations where the evidence counsel
had uncovered in the investigation suggested further investigation would
have been fruitless or counterproductive."' Because in Wiggins's case
none of the evidence uncovered implied fruitlessness, the Court explained
that counsel should have continued to investigate possible mitigating
evidence. The Court's reasoning is circular: the Court essentially
concluded that the investigations it found sufficient in the previous cases
were reasonable because the Court found the investigation in those cases
reasonable. Circular or not, however, the Court's efforts to distinguish the
prior cases' 12 and emphasize that it was making no new law serve only to
highlight the new lens through which the Court now evaluates trial
counsel's conduct. t 13
107 Terry Williams and Kevin Wiggins were both subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment
rather than the death penalty. Human Rights Watch, Beyond Reason: The Death Penalty and Offenders
with Mental Retardation at VIII (2001), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/ustat/index.htm (discussing
Terry Williams); New Sentence for Murderer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2004, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9CO7E6DF 133BF93AA35753C1 A9629C8B63&sec=&
spon=&partner=permalink&exprod=permalink (discussing Kevin Wiggins).
108 Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 522 ("In highlighting counsel's duty to investigate, and in referring to the
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice as guides, we applied the same 'clearly established' precedent of
Strickland we apply today.").
109 See id. at 542-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110 See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698-99; Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987); Darden
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 186 (1986); infra Part II.A pp. 7-9.
11l Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521-23 (2001).
112 See id. at 522-23 (attempting to distinguish).
113 As the Ninth Circuit confirmed after referring to the ABA Guidelines to establish professional
norms in an ineffective assistance of counsel case following Williams:
To be sure, Strickland advises us that prevailing professional norms of practice,
such as those reflected in manuals, "are guides to determining what is reasonable,
but they are only guides." . . . We nonetheless find it significant that these
professional standards were cited approvingly by the Supreme Court in the recent
Williams decision ....
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The Court's most recent decision about ineffective assistance,
Rompilla v. Beard,114 solidified the centrality of existing professional
norms, especially the ABA standards, for determining whether counsel's
performance fell below the reasonableness bar. Rompilla, like Williams and
Wiggins, involved a challenge to trial counsel's investigation in a capital
case. However, Rompilla adds the extra step of requiring trial counsel to
conduct a thorough pre-trial investigation not only to uncover mitigating
evidence but also to rebut the prosecution's case for death.
Ronald Rompilla's relatively brief sentencing hearing consisted of
testimony by five of his family members who effectively argued for
residual doubt and "beseeched the jury for mercy," and testimony by
Rompilla's teenage son who spoke of his love for his father and testified
that he "would visit him in prison."' 1 5  The Court acknowledged that
Rompilla's lawyers had in fact conducted some investigation into possible
mitigation evidence, and that they had interviewed family members and
secured the assistance of mental heath experts. The Court stated:
This is not a case in which defense counsel simply ignored their
obligation to find mitigating evidence, and their workload as busy
public defenders did not keep them from making a number of
efforts, including interviews with Rompilla and some members of
his family, and examinations of reports by three mental health
experts who gave opinions at the guilt phase. None of the
sources proved particularly helpful. 116
Trial counsel later told the state post-conviction court that, based on
these efforts, counsel had concluded that further investigation would not
unearth any helpful evidence. 117 Rompilla was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death. His post-conviction counsel, however, "identified a
number of likely avenues the trial lawyers could fruitfully have followed in
building a mitigation case."" 8 The Court, looking to the ABA standards,
concluded after review that counsel should have examined school records,
"which trial counsel never examined in spite of the professed unfamiliarity
of the several family members with Rompilla's childhood, and despite
counsel's knowledge that Rompilla left school after the ninth grade," as
well as juvenile and adult incarceration records. 119 The Court noted that
trial counsel also failed to look for evidence of a history of alcohol
Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 840 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688) (internal
citations omitted) (finding trial counsel constitutionally ineffective in failing to investigate defendant's
background and present potentially mitigating evidence at penalty phase of trial and remanding for new
sentence).
114 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
115 Id. at 378.
116 Id. at 381.
117 Id. at 381-82.
118 Id. at 382.
119 Id.
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dependence that might have extenuating significance, despite evidence that
such a dependency existed. Moreover, the Court determined that above all
else it was "clear and dispositive" that counsel was deficient in not
examining the files regarding Rompilla's prior conviction, which the
prosecution had made clear it intended to use extensively at the sentencing
hearing, and which, being factually similar to the pending capital charges,
also effectively negated the defense theory of residual doubt. 120
The Rompilla majority, relying on Williams and Wiggins, quoted
extensively from the ABA standards. The Court particularly referenced the
ABA Standards regarding the duty to investigate regardless of the accused's
admissions or statements and the standard that the "investigation should
always include efforts to secure information in the possession of the
prosecution and law enforcement authorities." 12' The majority also looked
to ABA Guidelines regarding death penalty defense work, 122 specifically its
requirement that counsel in a capital case thoroughly investigate any and all
prior convictions. 
1 23
The jurisprudential shift is now evident and established. Lower
courts must consider the ABA Guidelines and other national standards to
determine the reasonableness of counsel's behavior in light of prevailing
professional norms as part of the ineffective assistance of counsel analysis.
V. An Effective Comparison
To anyone familiar with capital litigation, it was obvious that trial
counsels' performance in Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla, although poor,
was by no means extraordinarily poor. Every lawyer who has represented
death sentenced inmates for any period of time has had courts reject much
stronger ineffective assistance of counsel claims. This is not to suggest the
court reached the wrong result in Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla, but only
to make clear that, in the scheme of things, the attorneys were more
competent than many of the attorneys whose performances, when
challenged, were found to have cleared Strickland's low bar. 1
24
A. Strickland, Burger, and Darden: Examples of Adequate Investigation?
A comparison between the three cases referenced above and the
Court's prior ineffective assistance of counsel decisions demonstrates the
120 Id. at 383.
121 Id. at 387 (quoting 1 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1 (2d ed. 1982 Supp.)).
122 Id.
123 Id. (citing ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE
COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES § 10.7, comment (rev. ed. 2003)).
124 See, e.g., Robert R. Rigg, The Constitution, Compensation, and Competence: A Case Study, 27
AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 7-9 (1999) (listing cases of lawyers found effective despite seemingly obvious
deficiencies such as using drugs, sleeping through trial, and suggesting in closing that death is an
appropriate punishment).
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transition in the rigor of the Court's review of claims that trial counsel con-
ducted an inadequate investigation. In Strickland v. Washington, counsel's
efforts were minimal. He spoke with the defendant about his background,
and he talked to the defendant's wife and mother via telephone. 125 Counsel
attempted one unsuccessful face-to-face meeting with Washington's wife
and mother, but never followed up. 126 According to the Court, the attorney
"did not otherwise seek out character witnesses for respondent." 127 Nor did
the attorney request a psychiatric examination because, based on his con-
versations with his client, he did not think the defendant had psychological
problems. 128 Despite the obvious shortcomings in trial counsel's develop-
ment and presentation of mitigating evidence, Washington's attorney was
found to have conducted an objectively reasonable investigation in light of
prevailing professional norms. 
29
Two years after Strickland, the Court reviewed counsel's efforts in
Darden v. Wainwright.130  Petitioner's claim centered around his trial
lawyer's refusal to present any mitigating evidence whatsoever at the
sentencing hearing. In fact, trial counsel testified at the habeas hearing that
"after a perusal of the mitigating circumstances in the Florida Statute
921.141 ... we reached the conclusion that Mr. Darden did not qualify" for
any of the statutory factors. 131 Moreover, trial counsel conceded: "I was
completely unaware that any mitigating circumstance, if relevant, is
admissible." 132 The Supreme Court concluded, however, that because the
trial court had informed counsel it could present mitigating evidence as to
any other facts that might have been pertinent, at that point "they knew they
were free to offer nonstatutory mitigating evidence, and chose not to do
So." 13" 3 Apparently, this choice to present no mitigating evidence in light of
a stated and actual misunderstanding of the law was objectively reasonable;
the Court gave short shrift to Darden's ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.
Perhaps even more egregiously, the Court majority concluded in
Burger v. Kemp, over a four-Justice dissent, that even though Burger's
court appointed counsel had "offered no mitigating evidence at all," Burger
failed to show that counsel's performance was deficient. 134 Chris Burger
was just seventeen years old at the time of the murder that resulted in his
death sentence. 135  He and an older companion, Thomas Stevens,
125 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 672-73 (1984).
126 Id.
127 Id. at 673.
128/d.
129 Id. at 700.
130 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
131 Briefof the Petitioner at 17, Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) (No. 85-5319).
132 Id.
133 Darden, 477 U.S. at 185.
134 483 U.S. 776, 788 (1987).
135 The Supreme Court has since held that executing individuals that were under the age of
eighteen at the time of their capital crime is prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
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kidnapped, sodomized, and drowned a cab driver in rural Georgia. Burger
was of limited intelligence with an IQ level that bordered on mental
retardation, and he had a violent and troubled family history that resulted in
a history of psychological problems. Counsel could have asked client's
mother, other family members, and a lawyer who had been involved with
Burger through the Big Brother program from the defendant's youth, all of
whom were willing to testify at the sentencing hearing regarding the
physical and emotional abuse Burger endured, as well as positive character
traits Burger possessed. Yet trial counsel presented none of this testimony
to the jury in mitigation of punishment. Counsel stated at the federal
habeas hearing that he had "based his decision not to move the court for a
complete psychological examination of petitioner on [counsel's] experience
with the mental hospital," which counsel thought to be biased against
criminal defendants generally. 136  After Burger's first death sentence was
reversed on appeal and the case remanded for a new sentencing trial,
counsel "simply proceeded in the same manner that had resulted in
petitioner's being sentenced to death at the first hearing."' 137  Ultimately,
even though the Court admitted "[t]he record at the habeas corpus hearing
does suggest that [counsel] could well have made a more thorough
investigation than he did," it concluded that counsel's decision to stop
investigating possible mitigating evidence was reasonable. 138
Wiggins's attorneys, in comparison, had obtained a written pre-
sentencing investigation (PSI) report that included a one-page account of
Wiggins's personal history where he had described his own background,
spent largely in foster care, as "disgusting."' 139  Counsel also "tracked
down" records from the Baltimore City Department of Social Services
(DSS) that documented the defendant's various placements in the state's
foster care system. 140 Moreover, counsel arranged for William Stejskal, a
psychologist, to conduct a number of tests. 141
As noted previously, Justice O'Connor was the author of both
Strickland and Wiggins. She also wrote a separate concurrence which
provided the essential fifth vote in Williams. Thus, the divergent
articulations of the investigation requirements in these cases are particularly
United States Constitution. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
136 Burger, 483 U.S. at 812 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
137 Id. at 814.
138 Id. at 794 (majority opinion) ("[W]e agree with the courts below that counsel's decision not to
mount an all-out investigation into petitioner's background in search of mitigating circumstances was
supported by reasonable professional judgment."). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Powell joined in
Part II of Justice Blackmun's Burger dissent which focused on counsel's failure to investigate possible
mitigating evidence as a denial of petitioner's right to the effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 816,
811-25 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Application of the Strickland standard to this case convinces me
that further investigation was compelled constitutionally because there was inadequate information on
which a reasonable professional judgment to limit the investigation could have been made.").
139 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523-24 (2003).
140 Id.
141 Id. at 523.
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striking and provide persuasive evidence that the Court intentionally
changed course. For instance, in Strickland, Justice O'Connor wrote,
"choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable
precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the
limitations on investigation."' 142  She continued, "when the facts that
support a certain potential line of defense are generally known to counsel
because of what the defendant has said, the need for further investigation
may be considerably diminished or eliminated altogether." 143  She thus
originally approved of only cursory investigation so long as counsel was
able to determine that more investigation would be futile. This requirement
in Strickland, when combined with the Court's stated deference to counsel's
tactical determinations, mandated only a very minimal investigation.
In contrast, in Wiggins, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority,
concluded that the Maryland Court of Appeals erred when it erroneously
"assumed that because counsel had some information with respect to
petitioner's background ... they were in a position to make a tactical choice
not to present a mitigation defense." 144  This contrary conclusion,
particularly when viewed in light of the mantra that "counsel is strongly
presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant
decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment,"' 145
illuminates the Court's new method for ineffective assistance of counsel
review.
In Williams, the court also found inadequate performance based on
an insufficient investigation, primarily into possible mitigation. 146 Before
Williams, none of the cases had required anything even remotely
resembling the investigation the Court suddenly found legally
inadequate. 147
Rompilla is probably the most divergent of the prior cases because
of the stringent requirements it places on counsel to conduct a meaningful
142 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984).
143 Id.
144 Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527 (alteration in original).
145 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
146 See supra note 92 and surrounding text with respect to Williams investigation.
147 Justice Scalia highlighted this point again when he referred to the new law made in Williams
in his Wiggins dissent:
The Court is mistaken to assert that [the Williams] discussion "made no new law."
There was nothing in Strickland, or in any of our "clearly established" precedents
at the time of the Virginia Supreme Court's decision, to support Williams' state-
ment that trial counsel had an "obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of
the defendant's background".... Insofar as this Court's cases were concerned,
Burger v. Kemp had rejected an ineffective-assistance claim even though ac-
knowledging that trial counsel "could well have made a more thorough investiga-
tion than he did." And Strickland had eschewed the imposition of such "rules" on
counsel, specifically stating that the very ABA standards upon which Williams
later relied "are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only
guides." (emphasis added). Williams did make new law ....
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 542-543 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations and internal cita-
tions omitted).
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investigation. Tthe Court acknowledged that trial counsel had done some
investigation, questioned several possible mitigation witnesses, and
reviewed mental health examinations. 148  After contrasting the Darden
Court's acceptance of the lawyer's rash decision to present no mitigation
based on a legally incorrect premise and minimal investigation and the
Burger Court's acceptance of counsel's decision to put the brakes on his
investigation in its infancy with the Rompilla Court's holding, it becomes
apparent a new standard emerged in Rompilla.
It is also important to note that Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla
were all governed by AEDPA.149  In order to grant the writs of habeas
corpus, the Court had to conclude that the lower state courts' decisions that
trial counsel's performance had not been objectively unreasonable were
themselves objectively unreasonable. 150 This skeptical review of counsel's
behavior hardly seems consistent with a Court that once held "a fair
assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight .... 151
VI. The Return of the Guidelines Approach
A. The Guidelines Approach: Then and Now
As we have said, the most* significant doctrinal development was
the Court's reliance on the ABA's Guidelines. The ABA Guidelines and
Standards regarding the obligation to thoroughly investigate permeate
Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla. Much like Judge Bazelon's original
checklist approach, the Court basically adopted the ABA's Guideline
requirements for investigation as establishing the prevailing norms for
defense counsel. In effect, when considering the adequacy of trial counsel's
investigation, courts must now look to ABA standards, as well as local
practice, in order to determine whether the Sixth Amendment has been
satisfied.
Williams mentioned the ABA guidelines only once, for the
proposition that counsel did not fulfill their professional obligation to
148 See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 378-82 (2005); supra text accompanying notes pp. 18-
20 (discussing some of Rompilla's counsel's efforts in investigation and mitigation).
149 28 U.S.C § 2254 (d)(l) (The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act) (2001)
(mandating that a petitioner may not obtain relief through federal habeas corpus unless a state's
adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States"); see
generally, John H. Blume, AEDPA: The "Hype" and the "Bite, "91 CORNELL. L. REV. 259 (2006).
150 Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-28 (reviewing AEDPA and concluding state court's "application of
Strickland's governing legal principles was objectively unreasonable"); cf Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 540-41
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with Majority's conclusion that the state court had applied Strickland
in an objectively unreasonable mannor); see also supra note 92 (discussing J. Scalia's dissent in Wiggins
regarding the AEDPA standard)
151 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
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conduct an adequate investigation.152  Wiggins referenced ABA
standardsl 53 six times as the benchmark of appropriate attorney conduct.1
54
The Court noted that Wiggins's attorneys' investigation "fell short of the
professional standards that prevailed in Maryland in 1989." 155 The Court
declared that counsel's conduct "similarly fell short of the standards for
capital defense work articulated by the American Bar Association."'
'5 6
Moreover, Justice O'Connor listed specific topic areas on which the ABA
had declared that counsel should consider presenting evidence during the
mitigation stage, such as the client's medical history, educational history,
employment and training history, family and social history, prior adult and
juvenile correctional experience, and religious and cultural influences. 57
And finally, Rompilla cited to ABA standards on eight occasions as
evidence that trial counsel's efforts were below the constitutional floor.
58
In essence, these three decisions mark a shift towards the effective
assistance of counsel standard once hailed by Judge Bazelon. Although it
would be an overstatement to say that the Court has adopted the guidelines
or checklist method, the Court's repeated reliance upon ABA guidelines
reveals similarities to Judge Bazelon's approach. Wiggins, in particular,
embodies the spirit of Judge Bazelon's Decoster III dissent. The clearest
evidence of this embodiment is the Wiggins majority's description of the
ABA Standards as "norms." Initially, in Decoster III, Judge Bazelon
referred to the then-newly-adopted ABA standards as accepted "'national
norms. ' 159  This stands in sharp contrast to Justice O'Connor's
admonishment in Strickland that "[t]he proper measure of attorney
performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms," and ABA standards are to be used merely as guides to determine
reasonableness and not as "norms.' ' 160  Nineteen years later, however,
Justice O'Connor referred to Wiggins's counsel's abandonment of the
"well-defined norms" of the ABA standards.16' This shift in categorization
of the ABA standards initiates a modern doctrinal view that embodies Judge
Bazelon's view of the normative role of the ABA standards. 1
62
Another example of the Court's adoption of a guidelines-type
152 Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 522.
153 Wiggins also referred to local state standards of practice. Id. at 522-43.
154 Furthermore, Justice Scalia also emphasized the majority's use of the ABA Standards as
evidence that the decision in effect changes the law for ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. at 543
(Scalia, J., dissenting); supra note 92.
155 Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524.
156 Id.
157 Id. (citing I ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES 11.8.6, p. 133).
158 Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387-99 (2005).
159 United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 276 n.66 (Decoster ill) (Bazelon, J., dissenting)
(quoting Hodson, Revising the Criminal Justice Standards, 64 A.B.A. J. 986, 987 (1978)).
160 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
161 Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524 (emphasis added).
162 Id.
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approach for assessing the adequacy of trial counsel's representation is the
Wiggins Court's use of the "list" compiled by the ABA.' 63 The Court,
referencing the ABA list of counsel's obligations, held that counsel's failure
in one of the delineated categories evidenced her ineffectiveness. This
comparison is again remarkably similar to the approach of Judge Bazelon,
who advocated that courts utilize ABA standards to define minimum
components of effective performance.' 64 According to Judge Bazelon, "[a]
demonstration that counsel has violated one of these duties compels further
inquiry into counsel's conduct to determine whether, in this specific case,
counsel's departure from the prescribed standards was either 'excusable' or
'justifiable."' 165
The Wiggins majority analyzed that case in precisely the manner
Judge Bazelon advanced. After determining that counsel "abandoned"
some of the ABA-defined norms when the attorneys, for example, failed to
investigate Wiggins's family and social history, the Court went on to
determine whether this abandonment was unreasonable in light of what the
attorneys had in fact discovered. Faithful to the checklist approach, Justice
O'Connor compared counsels' performance to the ABA Standards and,
when she found that the attorneys violated one of the articulated duties of
counsel, she inquired further to see if counsel's omission was reasonable.
Upon determining that the failure to abide by the guidelines was not
reasonable, she concluded that the defendant had been denied his Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Admittedly, Judge
Bazelon would have been more upfront with his checklist technique.
Nonetheless, had he been the Justice deciding Wiggins's claim, he likely
would have proceeded in precisely the same fashion.
While we do not want to psychoanalyze the Court, we submit that
this shift was intentional. Roughly twenty years of experience with the
amorphous performance prong of the Strickland test convinced a majority
of the Court that more care on the part of defense counsel was needed.
Although the Strickland majority had been concerned that a guidelines
approach might become a straightjacket leading to excessive, futile work on
behalf of attorneys and courts, the reality was that in the hands of most state
courts and many federal courts of appeal, the Strickland performance prong
was license to do nothing. In essence, the Supreme Court realized that
Strickland was part of the problem, not a solution to poor representation in
capital cases. Capital defendants were frequently being represented by
ineffective counsel, and the high threshold of the Strickland standard tied
the hands of appellate courts from doing much about the problem. 66 We
note, moreover, that some of our analysis is not mere speculation, as
163 Id.
164 Decoster 11, 624 F.2d at 282 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
165 Id.
166 See Adele Bernhard, Take Courage: What the Courts Can Do to Improve the Delivery of
Criminal Defense Services, 63 U. PinT. L. REV. 293, 303 (2002) (suggesting the "deplorable state of
criminal defense services" should motivate judicial action).
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Supreme Court Justices themselves have said as much regarding under-
represented defendants. 167  Accordingly, faced with the reality of the
representation and the ineffectiveness of the review process, the Court has
adopted the general approach Judge Bazelon articulated thirty years prior.
1. The ABA Standards
The ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function have been
through three editions since the original 1970 tentative draft. The first
approved draft was published in 1971, the subsequent edition was published
in 1980, and a third edition in 1993. The editions, however, are nearly
identical; the changes have been stylistic.
Standard 4-4.1 of the Defense Function delimits the duty to
investigate. The Williams court cited to the commentary portion of the
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (Standards) as support for the Court's
disposition. 168 The commentary contains a more robust discussion on the
role of investigation and the importance of mitigation evidence than the
standard itself. Moreover, the commentary lists specific actions it advises
are minimal to conducting an adequate investigation.' 69  Similarly, the
Wiggins court also cited to the commentary as part of the "well-defined
norms" of attorney conduct. 170  The Court noted the suggestion in the
commentary that the "defendant's background, education, employment
record, mental and emotional stability, [and] family relationships" are
important topics to investigate as possible sources of mitigation evidence. 171
The Court also cited to a list compiled by the ABA Guidelines to
the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases that
detailed topics counsel should pursue for mitigation evidence. 1
72
167 See e.g., Crystal Nix Hines, Lack of Lawyers Hinders Appeals in Capital Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
July 5, 2001, at AI (quoting Justice O'Connor who voiced concern that the judicial system was possibly
continuing to execute innocent defendants and that "[p]erhaps it's time to look at minimum standards for
appointed counsel in death cases"); Assoc. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Supreme Court of the United
States, Joseph L. Raugh Lecture: In Pursuit of the Public Good: Lawyers Who Care (April 9, 2001) in 7
WASH. U. J.L. POL'Y 1, 10 (2001) ("I have yet to see a death case, among the dozens coming to the
Supreme Court on eve of execution petitions, in which the defendant was well represented at trial.").
168 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) (citing I ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 4-4.1, commentary, p. 4-55 (2d ed. 1980). Although the Court cited to the second edition, the
commentary for the third edition is the same. All three editions note that the failure to make adequate
pretrial investigation and preparation may also be grounds for finding ineffective assistance of counsel.
(Only the third edition contains the word "also.") Ironically, the second and third editions cite to
Strickland as support for this proposition. The first edition contains the same language, but cites to
Shepherd v. Hunter, 163 F.2d 872, 873 (10th Cir. 1947) (denying petitioner's ineffective assistance of
counsel claim but noting that counsel conducted an investigation). But see Klein, Emperor Gideon,
supra note 30, at 654-656 (advocating for a standard-based approach but noting that the ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE are not specific enough to be accurate guidelines for effective
counsel).
169 See I ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4. 1, commentary (2d ed. 1980).
170 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003).
171 See I ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1, commentary (2d ed. 1980).
172 ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH
PENALTY CASES 11.8.6., p. 133 (1989) (The Defense Counsel at the Sentencing Phase) [hereinafter
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These same Guidelines establish that defense counsel has a duty to
discover all reasonably available evidence. 173  Published in 1989 by the
American Bar Association in order to simplify previously adopted
Association positions on effective assistance of counsel in capital cases,174
the Guidelines state that their impetus is to improve representation in capital
cases because post-conviction review does not, and can not, cure the
problem of deficient counsel: "examples of poor performance by trial
counsel cannot be ignored on the theory that appellate or post-conviction
review will cure trial level error; in several instances deficient performance
has not led to reversal." 1
75
2. Other Advocates for Enumerated Standards
The concept of "standards" for counsel was not a novel idea, even
before the initial ABA promulgations relied upon by Judge Bazelon in his
Decoster III dissent. For example, in Gideon v. Wainwright,176 which
mandated that states provide counsel to indigent defendants facing felony
charges, the Court indirectly touched on defense counsel's obligations.
177
Abe Fortas, who later became a Supreme Court Justice, represented Gideon.
His appellate brief focused on not just why a defendant was constitutionally
entitled to the assistance of counsel, but on how competent counsel in
Gideon's case would have proceeded. 178 Moreover, the amicus brief by the
attorneys general, who argued against the mandatory appointment of
counsel for state indigent defendants, acknowledged that counsel would
help the accused perform various specific tasks including making
evidentiary motions, making objections, examining and cross-examining
witness, and arguing to the jury, activities they characterized as necessary
aspects of a criminal trial. 179 Thus, Gideon v. Wainwright was grounded on
accepted standards of what constitutes effective representation.
VII. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Today
The remolding of the Strickland standard in these three decisions
has begun to produce results in the lower state and federal courts. As one
GUIDELINES].
173 See id. at 11.4.1 (c), p. 93 ("Investigation").
174 Id., Introduction (emphasis added).
175 Id. at 1.1, commentary p. 33.
176 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
177 See ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 208-238 (1964) (detailing the historical
significance of the Gideon decision).
178 See Brief for the Petitioner at 48-50, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (No. 155).
179 Brief for State of Alabama as Amici Curiae at 10, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(No. 155) (arguing that because the indigent defendant lacks counsel to do such activities, the
prosecution will also generally do away with such critical practices); see also Kim Taylor-Thompson,
Tuning Up Gideon's Trumpet, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1461, 1473-76 (2003) (discussing circumstances
that gave rise to the Gideon opinion).
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court of appeals has stated, "[G]eneral principles have emerged regarding
the duties of criminal defense attorneys that inform our view as to the
'objective standard of reasonableness' by which we assess attorney
performance, particularly with respect to the duty to investigate.... [T]he
Supreme Court has cited with approval the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice as indicia of the obligations of criminal defense attorneys."'
' 80
Judicial statements such as these evidence the effect of the Court's
decisions.
Because our conclusions as to the effect of the decisions could be
merely impressionistic, we thought it prudent to test our theory. To do so,
we determined how many ineffective assistance of counsel claims
succeeded in the six years before Williams, and compared that number to
the number of successful cases since Williams. Our analysis revealed a
marked increase in the number of successful cases. In the state courts, the
total number of successful ineffective assistance of counsel claims from
1994 until the Court's decision in Williams in 2000 was 223. After
Williams, the number of successful cases rose to 330 in a six-year period.
We also examined the number of successful ineffective assistance of
counsel claims in state courts involving death-sentenced inmates.
Comparing the same time periods, the number of successful claims in state
courts rose from 34 to 47. In federal courts we observed the same pattern of
increase. From 1994 until the Court's decision in Williams, there were 75
successful ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Post-Williams, the
number increased to 122. In capital cases decided by the federal courts of
appeal over the same time period, the number of successful ineffective
assistance of counsel claims rose from 32 to 47. These numbers are
captured in table 1.
TABLE 1
SUCCESSFUL INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS1
All State State Capital All Federal Federal Capital
Cases Cases Cases Cases
1994 to
Williams 223 34 75 32
Williams to
2006 330 47 122 47
180 Summerlin v. Schriro, 427 F.3d 623, 629 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Rompilla v. Beard 545 U.S.
374 (2005)) (examining counsel's performance in light of the ABA STANDARDS FROM CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 4-4.1 and reversing conviction for attorney's failure to investigate and develop potential
mitigating evidence for presentation at the penalty phase, for failure to conduct investigation of family
or social history, for failure to speak neither to defendant's family nor friends, and for using pre-trial
competency examination as only mental health defense evidence).
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Although these numbers are not definitive,' 8  they do seem to
support the proposition that Strickland's chokehold on ineffective
assistance claims has been partially loosened. 82 Courts' reliance upon the
Guidelines when analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims has also
increased significantly. Courts have recognized that counsels' performance,
especially in capital cases, must be judged against "'prevailing professional
norms such as those found in the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice."1 83
In Circuits more hostile to ineffective assistance of counsel claims, such as
the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, dissenting judges use the Guidelines even
when the majority does not.' 84
181 We say this because it is possible, although not likely, that the increase in successful cases
could be the result of more ineffective assistance of counsel claims being raised.
182 For example, the Fifth Circuit remanded Guy v. Cockrell to the district court to further
evaluate the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel's failure to investigate
and present mitigation evidence, largely because of the sole investigator's alleged conflict of interest
where, during the course of his investigation, he developed a relationship with the decedent's mother, so
much so that he was sole beneficiary of her estate when she died a mere six months after trial. Guy v.
Cockrell, 343 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2003). Counsel presented only four witnesses at the mitigation stage
who were not very familiar with the defendant and did not interview any close relatives, including
defendant's mother or aunt. The Fifth Circuit referenced Wiggins and Williams and noted "the Supreme
Court's recent emphasis on ineffective counsel claims indicates that we must be accurate and use care in
reviewing Guy's claim." Id. at 354 (citing Wiggins and Williams); see also Willis v. Cockrell, No. P-01-
CA-20, 2004 WL 1812698 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2004) (repeatedly referencing Williams and Wiggins and
finding ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate defendant's medical history where
defendant was being medicated, absent medical need, with inappropriately high doses of antipsychotic
drugs, and the effect on defendant's demeanor was apparent and the state frequently referenced
defendant's flat demeanor; and for counsel's failure to properly investigate mitigating evidence or
present any mitigation at the penalty phase or challenge the state's witnesses).
183 Marshall v. Cathel, 428 F.3d 452, 463 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding the New Jersey Supreme Court
unreasonably applied federal law in concluding counsel was not ineffective when the attorney failed to
conduct an adequate investigation for the penalty phase and relying on ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 4-4.1 to conclude such investigation was a professional norm at the time of the trial); see also
Canaan v. McBride, 395 F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing to the ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, the ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES, the NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION PERFORMANCE
GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, and the INDIANA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT for determining counsel's failing to consult with defendant regarding his ability to testify at
the penalty phase was deficient representation).
184 See, e.g., Buckner v. Polk, 453 F.3d 195, 215-16 (4th Cir. 2006) (Gregory, J., dissenting)
(looking to ABA GUIDELINES as the prevailing norms of attorney conduct to analyze counsel
deficiencies where majority fails to use ABA guidelines and denies ineffective assistance of counsel
claim); Moore v. Parker, 425 F.3d 250, 257 (6th Cir. 2005) (Martin, J., dissenting) (finding ineffective
assistance of counsel:
[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that "the ABA standards for counsel in death
penalty cases provide the guiding rules and standards to be used in defining the
'prevailing professional norms' in ineffective assistance cases." Those standards
provide that investigations into mitigating evidence should comprise efforts to
discover all reasonably available mitigation evidence, which should include
investigation into "medical history, educational history, employment and training
history,family and social history, prior adult and juvenile correctional experience,
and religious and cultural influences." The majority here fails to explain
adequately, let alone at all, how counsel's decisions, were consistent with
prevailing professional norms. The reason, I suspect, is because counsel's
performance did not meet that standard.
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A brief look at some representative cases will help illustrate the
change in state and federal courts' analyses. In Williams v. Anderson, for
example, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the Ohio Supreme Court's
decision was contrary to federal law because, in examining the petitioner's
ineffective assistance claim, it applied Strickland and concluded, without
analysis, that "counsel's failure to investigate and present mitigating
evidence was reasonable under prevailing professional norms.' ' 185  The
court cited to Rompilla's, Wiggins's, and Williams's reliance on the ABA
Guidelines as mandating that "trial counsel has an 'obligation to conduct a
thorough investigation of the defendant's background' in death penalty
cases."' 186  Because trial counsel did not conduct a thorough investigation
and because the failure to do so was prejudicial, the Sixth Circuit granted
the writ of habeas corpus. 1
87
In Dickerson v. Bagley, the court found ineffective assistance of
counsel where counsel failed to conduct a thorough and complete
mitigation investigation, pointedly noting:
[T]he Supreme Court... has made it clear and come down hard
on the point that a thorough and complete mitigation
investigation is absolutely necessary in capital cases. The Court
has relied on 1989 and 2003 ABA Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases, for the required norms and duties of counsel.'88
Id. (citations omitted).
185 460 F.3d 789, 801 (6th Cir. 2006).
186 Id. at 802.
187 In Clark v. Mitchell, however, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of petitioner's habeas
corpus challenge, saying in a footnote:
The fact that Clark's counsel retained psychological and psychiatric experts to aid
in Clark's defense demonstrates that Clark's counsel complied with American Bar
Association Guidelines requiring counsel to perform an investigation into a
defendant's mental health status and not to rely merely on their own observations
to detect any possible mental health conditions from which the defendant may be
suffering.
425 F.3d 270, 285 n.5 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing GUIDELINES, supra note 172). Judge Merritt
criticized the majority opinion as being "irreconcilable with Rompilla" and other case law concerning
counsel's duty to investigate mitigating evidence in capital cases. Id. at 290 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
Judge Merritt relied heavily upon various requirements of the ABA Guidelines, which he contends
counsel breached, and concluded that the majority simply refused to apply ABA Guidelines and the
Rompilla case. Id. at 294.
188 453 F.3d 690, 693 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Harries v. Bell, 417 F.3d 631, 638 (6th Cir. 2005)
(using ABA Guidelines as prevailing professional norms that investigations into mitigating evidence
should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut
any aggravating evidence the prosecutor may introduce, and finding counsel performance was deficient
and defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency); Howard v. Bouchard, 405 F.3d 459, 480 (6th Cir.
2005) (citing ABA STANDARDS 4-7.1(d), supra note 169, noting duty of defense attorney to preserve
record for appeal for finding counsel ineffective, although not prejudicially so); Powell v. Collins, 332
F.3d 376, 399 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing ABA STANDARDS 4-4.1, supra note 169); Coleman v. Mitchell,
268 F.3d 417, 452 (6th Cir. 2001) (analogizing to Williams and citing ABA STANDARDS for finding
ineffective assistance of counsel).
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The court quoted extensively from the ABA Guidelines in its decision, and
affirmatively indicated that the Wiggins and Rompilla decisions "mean[]
that counsel for defendants in capital cases must fully comply with these
professional norms."
1 89
The ABA Guidelines have now become an important and, more
importantly, widely accepted tool in evaluating defense counsel's conduct.
And, as noted above, using the guidelines approach seems to make a
difference.' 90 This is a positive development not only because justice in
individual cases is further served, but it is also a positive development
systematically because the acceptance of the Guidelines as professional
norms draws lawyers attention to specific duties and tasks which are
integral to effective representation. 
191
We wish we could end this article on a positive note. But that
would not be characteristic of at least one of the authors. Despite the
189 Bagley, 453 F.3d at 693; see also, e.g., Landrigan v. Schriro, 441 F.3d 638, 643 (9th Cir.
2006) (citing to ABA GUIDELINES when concluding counsel's performance failed to conform with
prevailing standards by failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence, and remanding to allow
petitioner evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel claim); Earp v. Omoski, 431 F.3d
1158, 1175 (9th Cir. 2005) (same); Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181, 1202-03 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing
ABA STANDARDS 4-4.1, supra note 169, for concluding failure to investigate brain damage and mental
illness constituted ineffective assistance); Gersten v. Senkowski, 426 F.3d 588, 609 (2d Cir. 2005)
(citing ABA STANDARDS 4-4.1, supra note 169, for concluding counsel's "apparent failure even to
request to examine [slides representing victim physical trauma] was a serious dereliction of his duty to
investigate the facts and circumstances of petitioner's case" and referring to Rompilla and Wiggins for
further support of ABA GUIDELINES to determine reasonableness).
190 See, e.g., Reyes v. Quarterman, 195 F. App'x 272 (5th Cir. 2006) (looking to ABA
GUIDELINES to affirm district court conclusion that counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct an
investigation into punishment before starting the capital trial and failing to offer certain mitigation
evidence, although affirming decision that deficient representation was not prejudicial); Davis v.
Greiner, 428 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2005) (referring to the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT for
concluding defense counsel's failure to inform petitioner during plea negotiations that his statements at
proffer sessions could be used against him if he stood trial was not in accord with professional norms
and fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and referencing Wiggins's acknowledgment of
the ABA GUIDELINES as guides for reasonableness for further support, but ultimately holding petitioner
was not prejudiced by the inadequate representation). But see, e.g., United States v. Best, 426 F.3d 937,
945 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Rompilla's use of ABA STANDARDS 4-4.1, supra note 169, but finding no
ineffective assistance of counsel).
191 For example, the Second Circuit countenanced:
Norms of practice, reflected in national standards like the American Bar
Association (ABA) Standards for Criminal Justice, are useful guides for
evaluating reasonableness. The Supreme Court has frequently cited the ABA
Standards in its decisions evaluating the constitutional sufficiency of defense
counsels' investigations.
Greiner v. Wells, 417 F.3d 305, 321 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted) (concluding counsel
acted consistent with ABA STANDARDS, such as 4-7.6, and finding insufficient evidence to overcome
presumption of constitutionally effective counsel based on the record of performance). Similarly, the
Eighth Circuit in Nooner v. Norris heavily examined the ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND
PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, quoting the language extensively to articulate
why counsel performance was deficient. 402 F.3d 801, 812-13 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding deficient
performance by counsel and remanding for further proceedings with respect to prejudice). See also
McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing to ABA MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, although holding no ineffective assistance of counsel); Frye v. Lee, 235 F.3d
897 (4th Cir. 2000) (referencing ABA GUIDELINES but finding representation legally adequate because
counsel performed some sufficient steps).
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Supreme Court's clear message, a number of courts still remain hostile to
ineffective assistance of counsel claims and are still willing to put a judicial
stamp of approval on appallingly inadequate representation. The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals falls into this category. In fact, during the entire
period we observed, only one death-sentenced inmate prevailed on his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Some of the cases affirmed by that
court involved truly abysmal representation. For example, in the capital
case Ex parte Martinez,192 although evidence existed that the defendant-
who had no history of violence in his background-had ingested large
amounts of a strong psychoactive drug known to increase aggressive ten-
dencies in certain circumstances, along with other narcotics and alcohol,
counsel failed to investigate or present evidence of the drug use or how it
may have affected the defendant's mental condition at the time of the of-
fense. 193 Counsel failed to investigate or present evidence regarding the se-
vere physical, emotional, and sexual abuse the defendant endured as a child
even though several family members asserted at state habeas proceedings
that, had they been contacted, they would have testified regarding the se-
vere physical and emotional abuse defendant had suffered as a child at the
hands of his grandparents and his mother and the sexual abuse his mother
inflicted upon him. 194 Trial counsel neither interviewed persons with whom
defendant had lived who would have further substantiated the abuse, 95 nor
did counsel investigate or discover that the county social services depart-
ment had allegedly been involved with the family for several years. 196 In
fact, at the penalty phase, counsel called the defendant's mother, but failed
to offset the damning statement she made when she turned to defendant on
cross-examination and said, "Why did you do it?" 1
97
Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit is little better. While the number of
successful claims challenging counsel's representation in capital cases did
rise from four to fourteen, many death sentenced inmates' claims were
192 195 S.W.3d 713 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
193 Id. at 721-22.
194 Id. at 725-26.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 716.
197 Id. at 725; see also Exparte Woods, 176 S.W.3d 224, 226-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (finding
no ineffective assistance of counsel even though admitting mitigation presented was "minimal" and
evidence existed, but was not presented or sufficiently investigated, of defendant's "deeply troubled
past"); Ex parte McFarland, 163 S.W.3d 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (finding no ineffective assistance
of counsel even though retained lead counsel slept through nearly entire trial and second appointed
counsel-who had never tried a capital case and was instructed to follow sleeping counsel's lead-failed
to interview any state witnesses, visited defendant only once in person before trial, was unable to locate
any of the potential witnesses defendant posited, and, at punishment stage, for which defendant's side
lasted only fifteen minutes, failed to call any family or character witnesses; court denying ineffective
assistance claim notably failed to cite either Williams or Wiggins in its decision denying relief); Ramirez
v. Dretke, 398 F.3d 691 (5th Cir. 2005) (denying petition for writ of habeas corpus because Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals did not unreasonably apply federal law when it rejected the defendant's testimony
that he had discussed his alibi witness with his defense counsel, who refused to investigate alibi listed in
prosecutor's files).
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rejected in spite of strong evidence of attorney incompetence. 198 We refer
to the recent case of Smith v. Quarterman.199 Smith had three separate
punishment trials. He was represented by the same lawyer at all three
proceedings and was sentenced to death each time. He raised an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim after he was sentenced to death for the third and
final time, based on his lawyer's failure to present any mitigating evidence
whatsoever, failure to present any rebuttal evidence on the issue of future
dangerousness, and failure to adequately investigate available mitigating
evidence. On habeas proceedings, defendant asserted counsel could have
presented evidence including testimony from a clinical psychologist that
defendant suffered from a chronic brain injury stemming from an accident
during his childhood; testimony from another psychologist that the
probability that defendant would pose a future danger was low; testimony
from his mother, half-sister, aunt, and cousin regarding their love for
defendant, his head injury and subsequent impaired intellectual functioning;
defendant's own testimony that he was young and intoxicated when he
committed the murder and was extremely remorseful; and defendant's
juvenile offense and jail records. Ultimately, the court concluded defense
counsel's decisions not to call a single witness, or adequately rebut the
198 See, e.g., Alexander v. Quarterman, 198 F. App'x 354, 359 (5th Cir. 2006) (explicitly
distinguishing Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla, and finding that because "most of the evidence brought
forth in [defendant's] habeas petition was presented at the punishment phase of the trial either by the
state or by trial counsel," trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate or present mitigating
evidence regarding defendant's repeated suicide attempts or emotional trauma surrounding father's
sexuality, or for failing to explain how circumstances of defendant's childhood that state introduced in
support of death sentence affected defendant and mitigated his culpability); Rodriguez v. Quarterman,
204 F. App'x 489 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding trial counsel's failure to investigate nor present evidence on
defendant's severe frontal lobe brain damage and the link between that damage and defendant's
impulsive nature; failure to introduce records from a psychiatric facility where defendant was treated
prior to trial that were known to counsel but not presented; and failure to present testimony of neuro-
psychologist that defendant's abusive upbringing, lengthy drug addiction, and cocaine use damaged
defendant's brain were strategic choices by counsel who instead presented evidence that defendant was
changed person); Whitaker v. Quarterman, 200 F. App'x 351, 354-55 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding state court
did not act unreasonably in denying petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim where trial coun-
sel, who knew petitioner was "beaten as a child, periodically suffered seizures, had attempted to commit
suicide on several occasions, and had suffered a head injury after falling from a moving truck as a
child," but "failed to have [petitioner] examined by, or to present testimony from, a mental health expert
during the punishment phase of his trial," because petitioner had presented no evidence on state habeas
proceedings as to how such a mental health expert would have in fact testified); Hood v. Dretke, 93 F.
App'x 665, 668-69 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting the court's "determination whether the state court
unreasonably applied Strickland is guided by the Supreme Court's decisions in Williams and . . .
Wiggins," but finding no prejudice in counsel's failure to present mitigation evidence consisting of
affidavits, social services records, school records, and a social history report that presented additional
details about defendant's injuries when he was nearly crushed by a truck, behavioral problems in school
and learning disability, and indicated that defendant and his brother were physically and emotionally
abused by their father and that father sexually molested defendant's two sisters, and that defendant may
have suffered some type of brain damage at birth; the court carefully distinguished Wiggins, ultimately
concluding that the mitigation evidence Hood's counsel failed to present was not as significant as that
left out in Wiggins's penalty phase, and that the aggravating factors were also more significant); Chase
v. Epps, 83 F. App'x 673 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no ineffective assistance even though counsel failed to
investigate clear evidence of mental retardation or present such evidence at penalty phase).
199 222 F. App'x 406 (5th Cir. 2007).
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future dangerousness, were reasonable strategic decisions which passed
muster under Strickland.
The worst offender, however, is the Fourth Circuit.200 It has
repudiated every single ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised by a
death-sentenced inmate after Williams.2 °1  In Buckner v. Polk,2  a capital
case where the defendant asserted an actual innocence claim, the majority
found counsel was not ineffective despite the court's acknowledgement that
the bulk of counsel's work in preparation for mitigation occurred during the
week that he was also participating in the guilt phase of the trial and
handling his partnership's IRS difficulties, and that counsel's "efforts were
certainly less than optimal. 2 °3 Counsel had in fact attempted to withdraw
as trial counsel "when it became clear that his partnership's financial
difficulties would unacceptably interfere with his representation, but the
state trial court denied his motion.,
204
A review of recent cases thus reveals that, although the adjudication
of ineffective assistance of counsel claims has become more rigorous since
the Court's three decisions in Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla, embracing
the ABA Guidelines, the guidelines approach is not a panacea.
Additionally, while we acknowledge that a full discussion on the
subject is better left to another article, our discussion with respect to
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in Texas would not be complete if
we did not mention the "distorting" effect of abysmal state habeas corpus
representation. 20 5  Because of very poor post-conviction representation,
many meritorious ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims are simply
not uncovered because the second level of incompetence-the
ineffectiveness of habeas counsel-covers the first.20 6 The significance of
200 See Blume & Johnson, supra note 43.
201 See, e.g., Emmett v. Kelly, 474 F.3d 154, 173 (4th Cir. 2007) (concluding, over an adamant
dissent, that counsel was not ineffective even though he had failed to retrieve the defendant's juvenile
mental health records, social services records, or juvenile court file, or interview additional relatives and
juvenile authorities, sources that would have provided information about the squalid, abusive
circumstances in which the defendant was waived); Lovitt v. True, 403 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2005)
(finding counsel effective despite limited investigation and failure to present any mitigating evidence
regarding defendant's horrific childhood).
202 453 F.3d 195 (4th Cir. 2006).
203 Id. at 202.
204 Id. at 202 n.5; see also id. at 208 (Gregory, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("No
reasonable defense attorney in a death penalty case would fail to pursue mental health expert advice
when faced with clear signs that the defendant had suffered psychological trauma.").
205 See TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE, LETHAL INDIFFERENCE: THE FATAL COMBINATION OF
INCOMPETENT ATTORNEYS AND UNACCOUNTABLE COURTS IN TEXAS DEATH PENALTY APPEALS
(2002), http://www.texasdefender.org/publications.asp; Chuck Lindell, Target: Sloppy Inmate Appeals,
AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Dec. 12, 2006, at Al.
206 Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are difficult to prove on direct appeal. See Mallett v.
State, 65 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (noting that allegations of ineffective trial counsel must
be firmly founded in the record and in most cases, "the record on direct appeal is undeveloped and
cannot adequately reflect the motives behind trial counsel's actions."). Defendants, however, have no
constitutional right to habeas counsel. See Ogan v. Cockrell, 297 F.3d 349, 357 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding
an ineffective assistance of state habeas counsel claim does not constitute sufficient cause to overcome
the procedural bar to federal review because there is no constitutional right to competent habeas
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the problem of dual ineffectiveness is impossible to overstate: when these
dual cases reach federal court, legitimate ineffective assistance claims
simply cannot be made because the state habeas lawyers' incompetence
defaulted the claims below, barring their federal review.
207
counsel); In re Goff, 250 F.3d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining that states that chose to provide
petitioners with counsel for state post-conviction proceedings are not obligated to ensure counsel meets
constitutional minimums for defense attorneys at trial or on direct appeal). Thus, incompetence on the
part of habeas counsel generally precludes review of any legitimate ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claims, effectively stripping defendants of review of their constitutional right to effective counsel at trial.
207 For example, the State of Texas executed Johnny Martinez on May 22, 2002 for the murder of
Clay Peterson. See Martinez v. State, 924 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Texas Execution Infor-
mation Center, Johnny Martinez, http://www.txexecutions.org/reports/269.asp (last visited March 12,
2008). At trial, Martinez did not contest his guilt and expressed his remorse for his actions. After his
conviction and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, Nathaniel Rhodes was appointed to
represent Martinez in state habeas corpus proceedings. Rhodes had never handled a habeas petition
before and the petition he subsequently filed on Martinez's behalf contained "boilerplate claims of
generic constitutional error." Martinez v. Johnson, 255 F.3d 229, 234 (5th Cir. 2001). His amended
application raised four claims, two of which were repetitive of arguments previously raised and rejected
on direct appeal, and the remaining two claims asserted record-based jury selection errors. Id.
However, Rhodes offered no explanation why these issues could not have been raised on direct appeal.
Rhodes failed to cite to either the record or any case authority in the required findings of fact and
conclusions of law that he submitted in support of the application. The Court of Criminal Appeals
denied habeas relief over a strong dissent arguing that the case should be remanded because of the
inadequate manner in which Rhodes handled the state habeas application. Ex parte Martinez, 977
S.W.2d 589, 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (Baird, J., dissenting). Although Martinez was appointed
competent counsel in his federal habeas proceedings, the damage was already done. The federal courts
denied habeas relief finding several viable claims to be procedurally defaulted and further finding that
the incompetence of state habeas counsel could not serve as "cause" to excuse the procedural default.
Farley Charles Matchett, executed by the State of Texas on September 12, 2006, was similarly
denied meaningful review of his conviction and death sentence due to the gross incompetence of his
appointed state habeas counsel. See Matchett v. Dretke, 380 F.3d 844 (5th Cir. 2004); Texas Execution
Information Center, Farley Matchett, http://www.txexecutions.org/reports/376.asp (last visited March
12, 2008). Matchett's state post-conviction application summarily listed seventy-two grounds for relief
but discussed only a few of the claims in any detail. Matchett, 380 F.3d at 847. The state courts
concluded Marchett's claims- "were unsupported by argument and/or authorities" and denied relief Id.
The federal courts concluded all of Matchett's claims were procedurally defaulted because his state
habeas counsel failed to adequately raise them in the state court. Id. at 849.
Unfortunately, these examples are but the tip of the iceberg with respect to the inadequacy of state
habeas counsel; inadequacy that forever forecloses review of constitutional inadequacy may have
already taken place. See also Ruiz v. Quarterman, 460 F.3d 638, 641 (5th Cir. 2006) (barring claims for
ineffective assistance of counsel and unconstitutional strictures of argument in mitigation because of
failure of state habeas counsel to raise claims before the state court); Whitaker v. Quarterman, 200 F.
App'x 351, 355-56 (5th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that state habeas counsel defaulted claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel for failure to conduct a proper investigation and noting capital defendant's failure
to present evidence at state habeas proceedings regarding how mental expert would have testified
regarding defendant's severe brain damage had trial counsel presented such evidence at mitigation stage
prevented court from being able to conclude defendant suffered prejudice from lack of such mitigation
testimony, and reiterating that the "law is clear in this circuit ... that ineffective assistance of state
habeas counsel does not excuse a petitioner's failure to properly present his federal habeas claims.");
Neville v. Dretke, 423 F.3d 474 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that failure to exhaust actual innocence claims
in state court barred federal review); Shields v. Dretke, 122 F. App'x 133 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding in
capital case where defendant raised twenty-eight claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel at
trial that all but three claims were procedurally defaulted for failure to bring those claims at the state
habeas level); Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 271 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting "infirmities in state habeas
proceedings do not constitute grounds for relief in federal court." (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)).
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Finally, we note that the court's increased use of the ABA standards
is only relevant to the performance component of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. As we alluded to above, Strickland's prejudice prong,
which requires the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been
different, is also badly in need of modification. Unless and until the Court
decides to adopt the second part of Judge Bazelon's method of analysis,
which requires that once deficient performance has been proven the
prosecution has the burden to demonstrate counsel's deficiencies did not
effect the outcome, ineffective assistance of counsel claims will still be
difficult to win. °8
VIII. Conclusion
As we have tried to demonstrate, Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla
mark a significant step forward in ineffective assistance of counsel
litigation. The Court's acceptance of the ABA Guidelines as professional
norms has invigorated judicial review of ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. Many courts now require a meaningful investigation into the full
range of mitigating evidence. But, unfortunately, those courts that were
most hostile to ineffective assistance of counsel claims under Strickland's
laissez faire regime have remained so. The Supreme Court likely still has
more work to do before the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of
counsel is a reality.
208 In Sonnier v. Quarterman, 476 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2007), the Fifth Circuit referred to the
Strickland standard for "[r]elying upon the guideposts of the American Bar Association's Guidelines for
the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases," to conclude that trial counsel's
failure to "mak[e] a reasonable investigation for purposes of uncovering relevant mitigating evidence
that could have been useful in reaching two goals that it was their duty to pursue" constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel. Id. at 357-58. Although counsel's failure to present any mitigation was not
unreasonable because it was based on defendant's explicit instructions, the court concluded that, in any
event, defendant could not satisfy the prejudice prong even if counsel had investigated and presented the
testimony of numerous friends and relatives who were available to testify to defendant's good character,
respectful and loving nature, and calm demeanor, because "[g]iven the overwhelming aggravating
factors, there [was] no reasonable probability that the omitted evidence would have changed the
conclusion that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and, hence, the
sentence imposed." Id. at 360-61 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 700 (1984)); see also
Amador v. Quarterman, 458 F.3d 397 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding appellate counsel deficient for failing to
identify a docket entry reflecting that the trial court had entered an adverse ruling on his objection to the
admission of witness's in-court identification of him, thereby preserving the objection for appeal and
concluding that identification procedure was unnecessary and suggestive but did not render subsequent
in-court identification unreliable so defendant was not prejudiced); Reyes v. Quarterman, 195 F. App'x
272 (5th Cir. 2006) (affirming finding of ineffective assistance of counsel, but concluding no prejudice);
Davis v. Greiner, 428 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2005) (referring to the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT for concluding defense counsel did not act in accord with professional norms and fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness, but ultimately holding petitioner was not prejudiced by the
inadequate representation).
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